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This study examines the input-output relationship for private under-
graduate education. The objective is to identify the relative contributions 
of human and physical resources in the production of quality undergraduate 
education. The research methods are noteworthy in three general respects. 
First, the theoretical orientation emphasizes interdependence among inputs 
and outputs in higher education. The significance of simultaneity is demon-
strated in an empirical model estimated via a three-stage least-squares 
technique. Second, the study introduces an original and promising data set 
for research in higher educational production. Of special note is an index 
of output reflecting the quantity and quality of institutional production. 
Finally, the exclusive emphasis on private undergraduate institutions offers 
a well focused perspective for policy decisions in higher education. 
The conceptual and empirical extensions presented in this study expand 
the basis upon which educational research can proceed. Further, the results 
have useful implications regarding the allocation of institutional resources 
across the basic inputs in higher educational production . Thus, the study 
directly addresses the current concern for a better understanding of the 
interactions among student quality, faculty quality, and institutional 
resources as they combine to produce undergraduate education. 
The report is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the focus and 
contribution of this research in relation to the economics literature. 
Section 2 specifies a simultaneous model of educational production. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data, variables, and estimation procedures. Empirical 
results appear in Section 4. Section 5 presents concluding remarks and 
suggestions for future research. 
1 . Focus and Significance 
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This study falls generally within the economics literature which has 
analyzed the educational process via a production function specification. 
While this literature is extensive, the vast majority of empirical investi-
gations have been limited to primary and secondary education. The official 
beginning of the educational production literature is commonly associated 
with the publication of the federal study, Equality of Educational Oppor-
tunity (1966). The Coleman Report, as it is more popularly known, sparked a 
series of efforts to identify empirically the relationship between resources 
and student achievement. 1 In contrast, remarkably little attention has 
been given to the production relationship in higher education. As Hanushek 
(1986) notes, 
Economic studies of higher education have been largely concerned 
with distributional questions related to access and costs faced by 
different groups ... ; virtually no attention has been given to 
production processes or the analysis of specific programs. 
(p. 1143) . 
Perhaps the major factor accounting for the relative dearth of pro-
duction studies in higher education is the complexity introduced by joint 
production. It is generally agreed that higher education, and universities 
in particular, produce three outputs jointly -- instruction, research, and 
public service. Although the literature contains some interesting efforts 
to address the joint-product dimension of higher education, modeling in this 
1 Averch et al . (1972) present the most comprehensive review of the 
early literature after the Coleman Report. An important survey and discus-
sion of the concept of an educational production function is given by 
Hanushek (1979). Some inkling of the extraordinary number of empirical 
analyses at the primary and secondary level is also provided by Hanushek 
(1981). That article contains a broad overview of no less than 130 studies. 
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area is clearly in its nascent stage. 2 Given this fact, it is expedient to 
limit the present study to undergraduate institutions; such a focus justi-
fies a simpler, single-product emphasis on instruction in specifying a 
model of educational production. 
The empirical base for this study is further limited to private 
schools. The analytical advantages of this tack are threefold. First, 
eliminating public schools buttresses the single-product emphasis by mini-
mizing the public-service mandate. Second, restricting the sample to pri-
vate schools serves as a broad means of controlling for socioeconomic ef-
fects when examining educational production across institutions. Third, 
this focus lessens the need to model behavioral relationships among faculty, 
administration, and government arising out of factors more common in public 
education (e.g. unions, legislatures). The potential significance of these 
relationships in revamping public educational policy has been discussed by 
Hanushek (1981). 3 Although Hanushek develops this point explicitly in the 
context of primary and secondary education, it is clear that political 
objectives and constraints also profoundly influence the character of public 
2 Theoretical discussions of university joint production are Nerlove 
(1972), Becker (1975), Garvin (1980) and Hopkins and Massy (1981). South-
wick (1969) and Sengupta (1975) are rare examples of empirical attempts to 
consider the joint-product nature of university production. However, their 
reliance on enrollment and research expenditure as output measures dimin-
ishes the value of these empirical efforts. In a recent survey, Hopkins 
concludes that "the current state of understanding of the interactions 
(i.e., joint production) - - at least in any quantitative sense -- is quite 
rudimentary" (1986, p. 16). 
3 Hanushek suggests that policy efforts to enhance output may need to be 
more sensitive to the incentive structure and political economy of the 
public school system, perhaps drawing upon theories of rent-seeking behavior 
central to the public choice literature. For a collection of the seminal 
literature on rent seeking, see Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980). 
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university production. 4 In comparison, private education would seem to 
accommodate a far more straightforward treatment of student, faculty, and 
administrative behavior. In essence, the focus of this study is confined to 
private undergraduate education for analytical convenience and clarity. 
This submarket, due to its relatively homogeneous character (private) and 
product specificity (instruction), is probably the simplest, and yet quanti-
tatively significant, segment of higher education for which the production 
relationship might be empirically tractable at this time. 
The contributions of this research are both empirical and conceptual. 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect bf the study is the method of quantifying 
educational output at the institutional level. Production across bacca-
laureate schools is measured as the nwnber of alumni who later receive 
Ph.D.s, M.D.s, or J.D.s. Measurement by institution in this fashion has 
important implications. 
Typically income or achievement test scores have been used as a proxy 
for educational output. Because these data are specific to individuals 
rather than institutions , previous studies have tended to identify factors 
that affect individual achievement within a single school system or 
college. In such a setting , all students face similar institutional 
characteristics . As a result, differential effort and social background of 
the individual student largel y account for variability in SLudent achieve-
ment. However, variance in the latter factors should become less pronounced 
when comparing output across undergraduate colleges, and perhaps especially 
4 For state universities, legislatures are not only a major factor in 
determining total budgets, the y also review tuition and student access 
policies. Recent analyses of these issues in modeling the public universit y 
are provided by Hoenack ( 1983) and Hoena ck and Pierro ( 1985) . 
Section 1 
Page 5 
so given the previously noted focus on private schools. Instead, the impact 
of differences in institutional characteristics -- student quality, faculty 
quality, and per capita expenditures on various facets of education -- can 
come to the fore. For this reason, policy inferences are attuned to insti-
tutional parameters rather than the characteristics of individuals. 
Indeed , it is somewhat surprising that this study represents a rela-
tiv e ly rare case of analysis across institutions. Most production studies 
of higher education have examined an individual school or selected depart-
rnent.5 With the exception of the authors' earlier note (1985), only Astin 
(1968) has looked at undergraduate education across institutions, and even 
Astin's study relies on a relatively small sample of 32 schools. The 
present study examines institutional production based on the output and 
characteristics of roughly 360 private undergraduate schools. Again, this 
comprehensive cross-sectional view at the institutional level is useful 
because it offers policy implications geared directly to managing institu-
tional variables . Such policy inferences seem particularly important con-
sidering the fact that so many of the variables influencing educational 
achievement are believed to be socioeconomic and student-specific, and thus 
often lie outside the policy realm. 
5 Breneman (1976), Perl (1976), and Hogan (1981) have examined the 
production of Ph.D.s within a graduate department or institution. Clearly, 
these authors have also chosen to focus on a single university output, 
although they opt for the graduate end of the instructional spectrum. 
Manahan (1983) examines undergraduate instruction , but only within a speci-
fic major and institution. Lewis et al. (1985) discuss the empirical liter-
ature of educational production in relation to computer-assisted instruc-
tion, but here again the focus is specific to an individual classroom or 
departmental experience. 
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The alumni achievement index has the special merit of capturing the 
quality and quantity of a school's production. This output measure is 
quality-adjusted in two respects. First of all, the explicit emphasis on 
alumni success in relatively selective professional careers imparts a quali-
tative dimension in and of itself. Stated differently, this output measure 
reflects academic production at the higher end of the achievement distribu-
tion. This focus deviates markedly from the common, and perhaps inordinate, 
emphasis on average measures of academic achievement in efforts to identify 
the relative productivity of various educational inputs. 6 Thus, concentra-
tion on professional careers is in itself a quality adjustment within a 
quantitative variable. A second dimension of quality adjustment exists 
within the index with respect to Ph.D. alumni. An algorithm has been 
constructed that weights each alumnus Ph.D. by the quality of the specific 
graduate program from which that alumnus received his or her Ph.D. degree. 
In short, the Ph.D. component of an institution's output will be measured as 
the number of Ph.D. alumni produced, adjusted for the quality of the gradu-
ate program each attended. In relation to the literature, these qualita-
tive dimensions of the output index appear quite significant. One of the 
most common and serious criticism expressed in reviews of the educational 
6 Astin (1973) has discussed this point at length. He emphasizes that 
any evaluation of efficiency in producing educational outcomes must be 
sensitive to effects throughout the entire achievement distribution, not 
simply in respect to improvements in mean academic performance. Astin 
interprets the traditional approach as reflecting an "egalitarian" defini-
tion of efficiency in educational production. In contrast, our emphasis 
might be thought of as attempting to identify efficiency in "elitist" pro-
duction. Given the recent concern for U.S. competitiveness and the critical 
nexus to education, it would seem increasingly appropriate to examine educa-
tional strategy from the latter standpoint. 
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production literature is a general inability to quantify educational produc-
tion in a manner sensitive to quality differences in output. 7 
On a conceptual level, the model developed in this study is noteworthy 
for its emphasis on interdependence among inputs in institutional produc-
tion . For example , the purchaser of the product the student -- is also 
one of the more important inputs. Similarly, the quality of the faculty is 
likely to be causally related to the quality of several other institutional 
attributes believed to contribute to output, not the least of which is 
student quality. The important modeling implication is simply that the 
production relationship is far more complicated than the input-output speci-
fication commonly found in the literature. 8 To address this issue, we 
develop a three-equation simultaneous model in which the quality of college 
output, faculty, and students are treated endogenously. The model is then 
estimated with three-stage least-squares estimation. 
In sum, this study develops a unique measure of institutional output 
within a relatively rare, yet conceptually appropriate, theoretical and 
statistical framework . Using alumni achievement, we attempt to measure the 
quantity and quality of output at the institutional level, while modeling 
the process with due consideration for the significance of simultaneity 
among inputs. The result of this approach is an improved method for assess-
7 For example, see Hopkins and Massy's book (1981), especially Chapter 3. 
8 McGuckin & Winkler (1979, pp . 242-43) make a similar argument in their 
intra-university analysis. They emphasize that although all students have 
access to the same potential level of university resources, students realize 
that potential at widely disparate rates. Their results show that studies 
which treat resources exogenously understate their role in determining 
student achievement. The relevance of simultaneous estimation in educa-
tional modeling is also raised by Summers and Wolfe (1977) and Hanushek 
(1979), although this issue is not the focus in these articles . 
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ing the impact of varying factor proportions on educational output. Fur-
thermore, the empirical focus of this research offers policy recommendations 
directly operational at the institutional level. 
Before turning to the body of this report, one prefatory comment is 
pertinent, if not obligatory. It is widely acknowledged that the term 
"production function", though tempting nomenclature, is technically inap-
plicable to this genre of research. Economists reject the label in the 
sense that learning theory has yet to provide a well-defined technology of 
education. Without such a foundation, theorists are hesitant to invoke 
Shepard's (1953) duality principle. It is Shepard's theoretical proof that 
permits inferences about the efficiency of production relationships to be 
drawn from empirical studies of cost data. Accordingly, cost theory becomes 
a means by which to assess the output implications of varying factor propor-
tions. Although we certainly acknowledge the correctness of this point, it 
may also be unduly arcane in a practical sense. We side with Cohn who 
concludes that any enhanced understanding of the economics in this area will 
necessarily be advanced in small steps. 9 Acknowledging that a large theo-
retical gap exists in defining the efficient frontier in education produc-
tion, we would still argue that existing cost data can be useful in reveal-
ing input strategies to improve educational production, even if that struc-
9 See Cohn (1979), especially pp. 188-205. For a more critical view, 
see Levin (1974). In essence, Levin argues that schools are inherently 
inefficient and therefore useful policy inferences cannot be gleaned from 
cost analysis. A similar perspective is expressed by Bowen (1980) in his 
"revenue theory of cost", i.e. colleges cost-maximize subject to their 
ability to raise revenue. Brinkman's recent paper (1986) includes a concise 
summary of this issue. His conclusions are supportive of our position. 
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ture itself cannot be rigorously shown, or even suspected, to reflect the 
efficient production surface in the pure sense. 
2. The Model 
The production relationship in education typically expresses output 
(e.g., income or GRE scores) as a function of resources (e.g., faculty, 
capital plant, endowment) and student characteristics (e.g., SAT scores, 
family background data). In functional form, 
Q = f(R,S) (1) 
where Q, R, and S denote output, resources, and student characteristics. 
However, this rendering of the production function ignores the fact that two 
of the more important inputs, students and faculty, enter the process upon 
considerable self-selection, especially among the more highly qualified of 
these inputs. Conceptually, a model of higher educational production should 
reflect the broader perspective that the quality of output can influence the 
quality of inputs, and that certain institutional resources may themselves 
enhance the quality of the inputs. This reasoning suggests the educational 
production process is more appropriately cast as a simultaneous system in 
which the quality of students, faculty, and college output are treated 
endogenously . 10 To address this interdependence, Equation (1) is respeci-
fied as the following three-equation simultaneous system: 
(2) 
10 This three-equation system represents the minimal level of simul-
taneity necessary to model the higher education process. An intriguing 
extension would be to model explicitly an administrative objective function 
as well. In its present form, the model implicitly presumes that institu-
tions attempt to maximize quality while recognizing input tradeoffs. Fur-
ther discussion of this issue is provided in Section V. 
where 
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a vector of three endogenous variables for school output (Q), 
student quality (S), and faculty quality (F). 
xi a vector of 25 exogenous variables, each generally repre-
senting institutional characteristics (e.g., tuition, endow-
ment, plant) . 
r 3x3 matrix of endogenous variable coefficients. 
~ 3x25 matrix of exogenous coefficients. 
ui a vector of three error terms assumed to be distributed 
normally with zero mean and constant variance. Errors may be 
correlated across equations. 
i observation index for 361 private, undergraduate-oriented 
universities. These are schools which do not grant doc-
torates, but may have master's programs and possibly a law 
school. 
Implicitly the model is written: 
Q f0 ( S, F, K, AC, AD, RE, FSR, ISR, USR, 
+ + + + + ? + + + 
CURR1 _ 4 , %MSTUD, %BUS, %ENG, %ED, Uq) (3) 
? + 
S f 5 ( Q, F, K, AC, T, SCH, %SCH, FSR, ISR, USR, 
+ + + + ? ? ? + + + 
CAMPUS1 _ 4 , CURR1 _ 4 , %MSTUD, u5 ) (4) 
? + ? 
F fF ( Q, S, K, AC, RE, E, FSR, ISR, USR, 
+ + ? ? ? + ? 
%MFAC, %TEN, %BUS, %ENG, %ED, uF) (5) 
+ + + + 
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where Q is an output inde x reflecting the number of alumni Ph . D., M. D and 
J.D . recipients ; 11 S denotes student quality defined as the third-quartile 
SAT score of the entering freshman class ; and Fis faculty quality as 
reflected by average compensation at the associate professor rank. The 
compensation data are adjusted for interstate cost-of - living differences. A 
notational key to Equations (3) - (5) is presented in Table 1. More 
detailed descriptions of the variables, construction of the output index, 
and cost-of-living adjustment are deferred until Section 3. The focus of 
this section is to develop the theoretical basis for each of the equations. 
Note that the predicted sign(+, - , ?) for each partial relationship appears 
under the variable. 
Equation (3) posits that successful alumni are the product of quality 
human (S, F, AD) and nonhuman (K, AC) resources. The nature (USR) and 
intensity (FSR) of the undergraduate instructional atmosphere are also 
deemed important in fostering success at the graduate level . Equation (3) 
includes four indices based upon dimensions of a school's academic program 
(CURR1 _ 4 ). These indices reflect curricular offerings such as honors pro-
grams , independent study, double majors, study abroad, and internships . 
11 Given the admittedly diverse nature of the respective career paths 
contained in the output measure, it is logical to wonder whether a factor 
analysis of these components might be a useful rendering of the quality of 
institutional production. We experimented along this tack, but found little 
change in the results obtained from the simple summation of the career 
components in Q. We were also intrigued about the applicability of LISREL 
(Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984) , a similar yet higher order procedure for apply-
ing weights to indicators of an unoberservable variable within the overall 
structure of a simultaneous system of equations. This approach proved 
inappropriate, however, because the LISREL estimates are highly sensitive to 
the structure of the model. For reasons discussed in the concluding sec-
tion, we would prefer to refine the system's structure before applying a 
full - information maximum likelihood technique such as LISREL . 
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Table 1: Summary of Variable Notation 
Q Output Index 
(#Ph . D . , #M . D . , #J . D . ) 
S Student Quality 
F Faculty Quality 
K Capital Stock 
AC Academic Expense 
AD Administrative Expense 
RE Research Expense 
T Tuition 
SCH Scholarship Expense 
%SCH% on Scholarship 
E Endowment 
USR Undergraduate 
Specialization Ratio 
FSR Faculty/Student Ratio 
ISR Instructor/Student Ratio 
CAMPUS1 _ 4 Campus Life Indices 
CURR1 _ 4 Curricular Program Indices 
%MSTUD % Male Student Body 
%MFAC % Male Assoc. Professors 
%TEN % Tenured Senior Faculty 
%BUS % Business Majors 
%ENG 
%ED 
% Engineering Majors 
% Education Majors 
Although one may be inclined to assign positive partial relationships to 
each of these curricular indices, there is in fact some ambiguity. There-
fore , we withhold prediction regarding these curricular coefficients until 
the discussion of their construction in Section 3. 
The remaining variables in the output equation (3) are control vari-
ables warranted largely by the unique nature of the output measure. For 
example, including a school's percentage of male students (%MSTUD) adjusts 
for the possibility that M.D.s, J.D.s, and Ph.D.s have been male-dominated 
degrees. Similarly, the percent of business (%BUS) and engineering (%ENG) 
majors controls for the likelihood that these alumni are more often termi-
nally qualified in a career respect, and thus less likely to progress toward 
doctoral degrees vis-a-vis the alumni from equal-quality schools which are 
more exclusively devoted to the arts and sciences. The percent of education 
majors (%ED) is also a control, but for the somewhat different reason that 
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the output variable constructed in this study does not encompass doctoral 
degrees in education . 12 
Equation (4) pr e sents a reduced-form modeling of a somewhat complicated 
market -- the market for student quality as measured by SAT. Viewed as an 
input, students suppl y, and colleges compete for, the quality necessary to 
enhance institutional reputation . The market roles are then reversed in 
terms of the educational product; students are the demanders and univer-
sities the suppliers. It turns out, however, that the predictions for many 
of the variables are unaffected by this complication since quality students 
are drawn, and vied for, via reputation. This broad concept of quality is 
reflected collectively by alumni achievement (Q), faculty quality (F), 
physical plant (K) , academic expenditure (AC), and factors indicating 
emphasis on the student (FSR, ISR, USR, CURR1 _ 4 ). Thus, the predicted signs 
are all positive. 
The relationships for the remaining variables in the student equation 
are less clear. The scholarship variable (SCH) illustrates this ambiguity. 
Although one might generally view financial aid packages as an effective 
mechanism to "buy" better students, Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984, p. 213) 
found a relatively low elasticity on the ability of scholarship increases by 
Cornell to draw the highest quality applicants away from schools revealed by 
students' acceptance decisions to be even more prestigious. Based on this 
finding, one must infer a consumer surplus at the preferred schools in 
12 Education Ph.D.s had to be excluded because doctoral programs in this 
area are not covered in the Jones-Lindzey study of graduate school rankings. 
For the same reason, the output measure also excludes doctorates in health 
sciences, business administration, meteorology, communications, and agri-
culture. 
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excess of scholarship differentials. Should this elasticity be equally low 
among the schools examined in this study, the linear nature of the estimated 
model could evince a negative coefficient for SCH. Therefore, the predicted 
sign for the student aid variables is unclear. 13 Tuition (T) is another 
variable with similarly subtle implications for modeling the quality dimen-
sion . A high tuition should be a deterrent to all students for an equal-
quality product. However, if tuition reflects real or perceived quality 
differences not adequately accounted for by other variables in the model, 
then tuition might exert a positive influence for better students. The net 
effect of CAMPUS1 _ 4 offerings is unclear. While a wide variety of activi-
ties might draw more student applicants, they will not necessarily draw 
better ones. Finally, the proportion of male students (%MSTUD) is included 
as a control for the possibility that males who go on to college have dif-
ferent SAT characteristics than do females. In sum, the hypothesized signs 
for the SCH, %SCH, T, CAMPUS1 _ 4 , and %MSTUD coefficients in the student 
equation are ambiguous. 
Equation (5) employs the average associate professor's compensation, 
adjusted for interstate cost-of-living differences, as a measure of faculty 
quality. Compensation was chosen because of its availability and objec-
tivity of measurement . Furthermore, given the undergraduate-oriented sample 
of schools, this measure is not appreciably affected by rewards for quality 
research or higher salaries of medical and legal faculty. We submit that 
13 0f course, this discussion presupposes that scholarships are used to 
attract top-quality students in the academic sense. But clearly this need-
n't be true for many schools. Scholarships are often granted for performing 
talents -- dance, music, athletics -- some of which may not correlate posi-
tively with academic potential. Furthermore, some portion of scholarship 
students are need, rather than merit , based. 
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compensation is the institution's primary means of attracting and retaining 
quality faculty in the long run. The associate rank was chosen because 
these faculty are old enough to have established their credentials yet young 
enough and mobile enough to take advantage of them. 14 
Equation (5) should be viewed as a reduced-form equation of a supply-
and-demand system for faculty quality. On the supply side, quality faculty 
prefer working with potential progeny (Q) and good students (S), ceteris 
paribus. On the institutional demand side, three control variables are 
included to adjust compensation differentials which are unrelated to faculty 
quality. The percent of undergraduate majors in business (%BUS), engineer-
ing (%ENG), and education (%ED) -- assuming these approximate faculty compo-
sition reasonably well -- are included as proxies for compensation differ-
ences attributable to different market conditions for faculty in quasi-
professional versus more traditional academic disciplines. A tilt toward 
business and engineering faculty is expected to increase the average assoc-
iate compensation, faculty quality held constant. In contrast, a high 
proportion of education faculty is predicted to decrease an institution's 
average compensation. By similar reasoning, schools with low undergraduate 
specialization ratios (USR) are predicted to have higher average compen-
sation because of the higher salaries paid to graduate professors, par-
ticularly in law or medicine. 
14 Reestimation of the system using assistant in place of associate 
professor salaries yielded very similar results in an earlier study. This 
is not surprising in light of the high correlations between salaries at the 
various levels -- assistant and associate, 0.90; associate and full, 0.95; 
and assistant and full, 0.83. 
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The remaining variables in Equation (5) reflect both supply and demand 
considerations. The size of an institution's endowment (E) represents 
financial security to faculty and ability-to-pay by institutions, both 
clearly positive influences . However , other important variables have off-
setting effects and thus indeterminant predictions for the reduced-form 
coefficients. For example, although faculty might prefer better physical 
facilities (K) and higher academic expenditures (AC), institutions might 
view these inputs as substitutes for faculty. And while faculty prefer 
higher research support (RE) and smaller classes (FSR), administrators might 
see these factors as income-in-kind. Therefore, the signs on these vari-
ables are ambiguous a priori, even though the actual results for these 
relationships are of obvious policy significance. 
On a more technical note , each equation is overidentified through the 
use of zero restrictions . Generally, an exogenous variable is excluded from 
an equation when there is no conceptual justification for its inclusion 
other than its influence on another endogenous variable. For example, 
consider our modeling of the endowment variable beginning with the output 
equation (3). Although the size of a school's endowment might alter output, 
its effect is really one of facilitating capital expansion, scholarships, 
faculty compensation, and so forth. Therefore, the latter variables are 
selected for the output equation rather than the value of the endowment 
itself . Similarly, the endowment is excluded from the student-quality 
equation since the manifestations of a large endowment (capital plant, 
faculty size and quality) are more visible to students than is the endowment 
itself. In contrast , however, recall that the endowment does appear in the 
faculty equation because of this variable's implication for an institution's 
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longer term financial security and thus a direct consideration of faculty. 
Another example of the general modeling criterion underlying identification 
of the system is the inclusion of tuition, research expenditures, and schol-
arships as factors influencing student and faculty decisions, but not out-
put, ceteris paribus. 
3. Data and Estimation Procedures 
The model outlined above is an extension of the theoretical framework 
developed by the authors in an earlier article (1985). The results of that 
research confirmed the strength of interdependencies existing among the 
endogenous variables as well as the importance of correcting for errors 
correlated across equations. Accordingly, the present estimation retains 
the modeling perspective of our earlier work. However, the current study 
substantially expands the sample size and refines the operational definition 
of several variables. 
3.1 Quality Adjustment to Output 
As emphasized in Section 1, perhaps the most intriguing improvements 
occur within the output measure. The revised output variable adds breadth 
and depth to the concept of alumni achievement as a measure of college 
production. First, the original focus on Ph.D. alumni is expanded to 
encompass M.D. and J.D. degrees. Furthermore, the Ph.D. component itself is 
now constructed to reflect differences in graduate program quality. 
The quality-adjusted Ph.D. component of the output variable is a 
weighted sum of each baccalaureate school's doctoral alumni. The weight 
attached to a doctoral degree is based on the scholarly quality of the 
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respective program's graduate faculty . The quality ratings are those devel-
oped by Jones, Lindzey and Coggeshall (1982). 15 The weights reflect an 
ordinal scale ranging from zero to five. 16 
Formally , the quality-adjusted Ph.D. output variable is defined as : 
where: i 
j 
n i 
~ 
j =l 
(JLCdg ) . 
J 
and 
denotes a baccalaureate institution. 
(6 ) 
(7) 
denotes a graduate of the ith baccalaureate institution who 
received a Ph.D . between 1971-1980 in any area of the biolo-
gical sciences, physical sciences, mathematical sciences, 
social sciences, or humanities. 
denotes the number of students from the ith baccalaureate 
school who went on to receive a Ph.D . in the above-mentioned 
fields. 
denotes the Jones-Lindzey-Coggeshall rating of the graduate 
program attended by the jth student. Program ranks are 
specific to discipline (d) by graduate school (g). 
15 This five-volume study surveyed several program attributes as they 
existed between 1976-1980 (e.g., size, library, research, reputation). The 
primary criterion for inclusion in the study was that a program had to have 
awarded some minimum number of doctoral degrees between 1976-1978. The 
minimum varies substantially across disciplines (e.g. 11 in History versus 
22 in Psychology). For more information on the origins of the study, selec-
tion criteria, and methodology, see Parts I and II of any of the five volumes. 
16 Evaluation of faculty scholarship was assessed in a peer review 
survey . Evaluators were provided with a list of each program's faculty and 
asked to judge the group as distinguished, strong, good, adequate, or 
marginal. A copy of the survey instrument can be found in any of the five 
volumes of Jones, Lindzey, and Coggeshall (1982). Generally, the majority 
of respondents were full professors . The number of respondents also varied 
by discipline (e.g . 152 in History, 185 in Economics , 280 in Psychology) . 
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Equation (6) calculates an average JLG ranking for all ni of a school's 
Ph.D. alumni. Equation (7) weights the number of Ph.D. alumni by relative 
Ph . D. program quality. Division by the sample mean JLQi serves to rescale 
this quality index to a mean of unity, thereby retaining comparability of 
output measures across Ph.D . , M. D., and J.D. alumni. 
Table 2 presents a descriptive summary of the coverage of the JLG 
program ratings, by discipline, in relation to the doctoral degrees received 
by alumni for this sample of baccalaureate institutions. Observe that 
program-specific JLG ratings are directly applicable for 27,178 a~umni 
graduate degrees. This represents a coverage rate of 79.4 percent. Regard-
ing the remaining degrees, two general circumstances required that certain 
program ratings be assigned. 
First, rarely are all the Ph.D. programs in any particular discipline 
evaluated . Rather, the ranking is often lower-end truncated. For example, 
of the roughly 130 Ph.D-granting programs in Economics, only the top 91 
programs are evaluated in the JLG study. In such instances, we assume that 
unranked programs are necessarily of the lowest quality, and therefore are 
assigned a rating equal to that of the lowest rated program in the specific 
discipline. In terms of actual JLG values, this procedure implies that 
unranked programs typically receive a quality rating in the range of 0.4 to 
0.7 out of a possible 5. This assignment was applied to 3,174 Ph.D degrees, 
which is 9.3% of the Ph.D.s received by :alumni of the baccalaureate institu-
tions in the sample. 
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Table 2 : Coverage of JLC Doctoral Program Quality Ratings for Degrees 
Received Between 1971-1980 by Graduates of Baccalaureate 
Institutions 
Rating= Rating -
Rating= Minimum Average Rating ~ 
Field JLG Rating JLG Rating Program JLG Missing 
Biological 
Sciences 3386 1002 1853 129 
Mathematics & 
Computer Science 1307 185 46 3 
Chemistry 3271 237 0 0 
Physics & 
Astronomy 1566 166 0 0 
Psychology 4868 577 0 0 
Economics 1202 94 0 0 
Political 
Science 1353 175 0 0 
Sociology 1566 52 2 2 
History 2319 152 0 0 
Letters 3307 249 412 10 
Foreign 
Languages 1075 115 235 12 
Other 
Humanities 1958 170 1017 165 
Total 27,178 3 , 174 3,565 321 
Percent 79.4% 9.3% 10 . 4% 0.9% 
Section 3.1 
Page 21 
The second case of fitted Ph . D. ratings occurs when none of the gradu-
ate programs in a particular field specialty are evaluated. Ratings for 
field specialties not evaluated are assigned the program's average rating of 
related fields within the broader graduate discipline . For example, the 
Parasitology degree at Stanford , a non-rated specialty, is assigned the 
average of Stanford's rated biological sciences programs . Although we are 
comfortable with this assignment algorithm generally, we believe that if a 
systematic bias exists, it probably operates toward understating program 
quality in those fields . 17 Overall this procedure applied to 3,565 degrees 
(10.4%), although as Table 2 indicates, it is used disproportionately in the 
specialized subfields of the biological sciences and humanities. In com-
parison, note that coverage by the JLG ratings in Chemistry, Physics, His-
tory, and the Social Sciences in general is remarkably complete. 
Although the JLG ratings are quite comprehensive with respect to the 
disciplines listed in Table 2, not all doctoral-granting disciplines were 
evaluated in that study (e . g . , education, communications, meteorology, busi-
ness, agriculture , and health sciences). Therefore, baccalaureate alumni 
holding doctoral degrees in these areas are not included in the computation 
of their school's Q1 . 18 We have mixed feelings about the quantitative 
17 This tendency seems likely since fields not evaluated usually reflect 
very specialized degrees awarded by relatively few institutions. Considering 
the level of specialization, one would expect the quality of the faculty 
scholarship to be at least equal to the average of the related rated pro-
grams in the graduate school. 
18 The obvious alternative to omitting the data is to assign ratings to 
these degree programs based on an average-quality concept analogous to that 
applied in the case of missing biological specialties within biological 
sciences. We would argue, however, that such an extrapolation strains the 
concept. While the average quality of the biological science departments 
may serve as a proxy for subspecialty merit, it is unclear why the average 
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significance of these missing disciplines. Taken together , the omitted 
disciplines account for 16,262 of the total 52 , 327 Ph . D.s received by all.111!,ni 
in the sample of baccalaureate schools . This implies that an alarming 31 
percent of the doctorates earned are removed from the output variable . 
However, it is remarkable that roughly 75 percent of these doctoral degrees 
are in education alone (12,305) . Netting out the disproportionate impact of 
education doctorates reveals the more encouraging fact that Qi captures and 
weights 85 percent of all non-education doctorates earned by the baccalaur-
eate alumni on our sample. 19 Thus, on balance, we are comfortable with the 
ability of Qi to utilize the JLG data to impart the qualitative differentia-
tion of alumni doctoral achievement which is desired . 
3.2 The Sample of Schools 
The sample of schools for this study has been increased to 361 institu-
tions, roughly twice the number in the original study. Beyond the obvious 
advantage of reduced sampling error, this larger sample works to correct for 
a sampling bias that may have existed before. The original source of bac-
calaureate school rankings by Ph.D. alumni was limited to the top 200 pri-
vate institutions . As such, the prior estimation of the model attempted to 
glean qualitative differences between schools which, by virtue of being 
among the top 200 baccalaureate producers of Ph.D.s, were qualitatively 
quality of, say, the graduate History, Psychology and Chemistry faculties 
would necessarily reflect the scholarly stature of the Education or Business 
program. 
19 Total Doctoral Degrees (52,327) less Education Degrees (12,305) 
yields Non-Education Degrees (40 , 022) . The sum of Qi includes 33,917 rated 
degrees out of a maximum of 40,022 non-education degrees. 
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similar, at least in a broad sense. The expanded sample offers greater 
variance in the output measure and thus a stronger test of the generality of 
our simultaneous model of educational production. 
The current sample maintains the focus on private, primarily under-
graduate institutions. Specifically, 80 schools lie in category IIA (Com-
prehensive Institutions) and 281 in category IIB (General Baccalaureate 
Institutions) as defined in Academe and by the National Center for Education 
Statistics. 20 This sample character is important since, in the absence of 
an explicit administrative objective function, the model implies an admin-
istrative utility function with arguments, or at least a rank of arguments, 
which may not be characteristic of university objective functions. 21 
3.3 Variable Construction 
Table 3 presents a detailed description of the variables and summarizes 
the predicted partial relationships developed in Section 2 . In order to 
adjust for differences in school size most observations are expressed in per 
student-capita terms. Note, however, that the student bases applied in the 
20 comprehensive Institutions are defined as having "diverse post-bac-
calaureate programs, but not engaged in significant doctoral level educa-
tion . . . institutions in which the number of doctoral degrees is fewer than 
thirty or in which fewer than three doctoral-level programs are offered." 
General Baccalaureate Institutions have "primary emphasis on general under-
graduate education . .. institutions in which the number of post-
baccalaureate degrees granted in less than thirty or in which fewer than 
three post-baccalaureate - level programs are offered." (Academe, 1983, p . 20). 
21 The reference here is to the difference in emphasis on research and 
publication at major universities in relation to the administrative and 
faculty utility functions. The impact which a differently oriented sample 
of institutions would have for the structural specification of our model are 
evident from Garvin's (1980) extensive theoretical and empirical treatment 
of university behavior . See especially Chapters 3 , 5, and 6. 
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per capita calculations are not uniform across variables. The per capita 
adjustment of the output variable (Q) is based on the number of actual full-
time undergraduate students, as opposed to "full-time undergraduate-equiva-
lent students" (FUE) in the case of input variables. The latter concept 
weights full-time, part-time , and graduate students differently. The 
appropriateness of this distinction follows from the fact that the output 
variable is couched in terms of graduate school achievement. By definition, 
only undergraduate alumni are included in this measure; and by inference, 
part-time undergraduates are much less likely to pursue a doctorate. Conse -
quently, a school with a high proportion of graduate and/or part-time 
students would have its output measure unduly deflated by using FUE, rather 
than actual full-time undergraduates. In contrast , from an input stand-
point, graduate students utilize school resources more intensively than do 
undergraduates, and full-time students more so than part-time students. 
Thus, FUE is the appropriate base for assessing input intensities. 
Several variables in the model are adjusted for regional cost-of-living 
differences. This adjustment employs MSA-level (Metropolitan Statistical 
Area) price indices constructed by Fournier and Rasmussen (1986). A school 
was assigned a specific MSA price index if it could be placed within that 
MSA according to the Census Bureau's definitions. Otherwise, the school was 
assigned a "rest-of-state" price index similarly generated by the Fournier 
and Rasmussen algorithm . 22 
22 Although we received the actual, unpublished indices from Fournier 
and Rasmussen (F&R), their methodology merits a brief summary. F&R built 
upon price indices calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Family 
Budget Series for 37 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 1970, and 22 
of those 37 in 1980. In a regression analysis, they found that several MSA-
specific variables explained nearly all of the variation in cost of living 
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Cost-of-living adjustment to the faculty compensation variable is 
particularly crucial considering the structure of the model. Because we 
rely on compensation to reflect differences in faculty quality, it is vital 
that this variable be purged of purely nominal, non-quality differences in 
compensation. Cost-of-living adjustment was applied selectively across the 
remaining variables. Our judgement was guided by whether the value of a 
dollar-denominated outlay is generally subject to local or national market 
conditions. For example, expenditures on academic, research, and admini-
strative support and the value of the capital stock are deflated because the 
purchasing power of these outlays is deemed to be more closely associated 
with local cost-of-living. The rationale for adjusting these categories 
seems especially convincing when one recognizes that a substantial portion 
of these expenses are tied to local wage and real estate costs. This link 
seems quite direct for academic and administrative support costs (e.g., 
secretarial and maintenance staff), and at least indirect in influencing the 
value of the capital stock since construction costs are significantly driven 
by local wages as well. Still, one can hardly contend that cost-of-living 
(COL), obtaining an adjusted R2 of 0.9934. Therefore, a specific MSA's 1980 
COL is estimated by multiplying the regression coefficients times the MSA-
specific attributes . Formally, a COL is estimated as: 
COL 12,810.53 - 36.75 ln(POP) + 1165.08 ln(Median Housing Value in$) 
+ (-5,276.92 + 1,172.99 ln[Median Housing Value]) (Northeast Binary) 
+ (-1,071.06 + 310.60 ln[Median Housing Value]) (North-Central Binary) 
+ ( 2 , 534.13 - 519.58 ln[Median Housing Value]) (South Binary) 
+ 1.63 (Per Capita State Government Revenues) 
+ 3.03 (Per Capita Local Government Revenues) 
Since we are only interested in relative living costs, the F&R COL values 
has been standardized relative to the U. S. population-weighted average COL 
( $22,595 in 1980 dollars). The resulting COL index has a mean of 0.991 with 
a standard deviation of 0 . 066 . 
Variable 
Output (Q) 
Ph .D. 
M.D. 
J .D. 
Students (S) 
Faculty (F) 
Capital (Kl 
Academic (AC) 
Administrative 
(AD) 
Research (RE) 
Tuition (T) 
Scholarships 
(SCH) 
% on Scholarship 
(%SCH) 
Endol«llent (E) 
Faculty/Student 
Ratio (FSR) 
Instructor/ 
Student Ratio 
(ISR) 
Undergraduate 
Specialization 
Ratio (USR) 
Mean & 
Std.Dev . 
15 . 68 
15.05 
6.37 
7.26 
3.62 
3 . 84 
5.69 
6.16 
1122.91 
106.93 
22.45 
2 . 91 
13 . 19 
5 . 37 
0.42 
0.28 
1.62 
0.72 
1. 32 
4 . 39 
4 . 68 
Table 3: 
Min 
Max 
0 . 58 
90 . 06 
0 . 00 
54 . 62 
0 . 08 
20 . 70 
0.00 
46 . 53 
720.00 
1500 . 00 
14 . 36 
31.11 
4 . 11 
32 . 40 
0.05 
2 . 33 
0 . 15 
8.84 
0 . 00 
52 . 85 
0 . 12 
1.32 8 . 37 
40 . 14 
27 .39 
44.80 
13. 92 
18.58 
15 . 33 
5.54 
1.41 
0.59 
0.47 
80 . 56 
16 .95 
7 . 01 
326 . 85 
14 . 00 
81 . 00 
3 . 90 
112 . 43 
2 . 67 
11 . 56 
0.00 
3 .25 
29 . 56 
100 . 00 
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Variables within the Model 
~ as aF 
ax ax ax 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
Definition and Comnent 
Alumni Career achievement : sum of Ph .D., M.D. & 
J .D. alumni as described below. 
Quality-weighted nllllher of alumni Ph .D. recipients in 
Jones-Lindzey-Coggeshall-ranked fields from 1971-1980a 
per 100 1981 full-time undergraduates . b 
Twice the number of alumni M.D. degrees from 1978 - 1982c 
(to reflect a ten-year period) per 100 1981 full-time 
undergraduates . 
Number of alumni J .D. degrees from 1968-1977d per 100 
1981 full-time undergraduates . 
Third-{fartile composite SAT score of 1981 freshmen 
class . 
Mean salary of associate professors in $1,000, e adjusted 
for local cost - of - living differences . ! Average of 1981-
82 and 1982-83 academic years. 
1981 book value of the capital stock,g adjusted for local 
cost-of-living differences, per student-capitah in 
$1,000 . 
1981 academic support outlays,g adjusted for local cost-
of-living differences, per student-capita in $1,000. On 
average, 54 percent of these outlays reflect library ex-
penditures . 
1981 administrative support outlays,g adjusted for local 
cost-of-living differences, per student-capita in $1,000. 
1981 research support outlays from any source,g adjusted 
for local cost-of-living differences , per faculty-capita 
in $1,000. 
1981 tuitionb in $1 , 000 . 
1981 scholarship expenditure,g as a percentage of 
tuition, per scholarship recipient. Excludes scholar-
ships like ROTC, where the school is not allowed to 
select the recipient. 
Estimated percentage of undergraduates receiving grants 
from any source in 1981-82 academic year.b 
1981 endowmentg per student-capita in $1,000 . 
1981 full-time facultye per 100 student-capita . 
1981 full - time instructorse per 100 student-capita . 
Undergraduate specialization ratio calculated as theb 
number of full-time undergraduates per 100 students . 
(continued) 
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Table 3: Variables within the Model (Continued) 
Variable 
Campus Index ill 
(NE Prep) 
Campus Index f/2 
(Joe College) 
Campus Index fl3 
(Artsy) 
Campus Index 114 
(California) 
Curricular Index 
ill (Flexible J 
Curricular Index 
112 (Depth) 
Curricular Index 
#3 (Local) 
Curricular Index 
#4 (Academic) 
% Male Students 
(%MSTUDJ 
% Male Associate 
Professors 
(%MFAC) 
% Tenured Senior 
Faculty (%TEN) 
% Business Majors 
(%BUS) 
% Engineer Majors 
(%ENG) 
% Education Majors 
(%ED) 
Mean & 
Std .Dev. 
10 .00 
1.00 
10.00 
1.00 
10.00 
1.00 
10 . 00 
1.00 
10.00 
1.00 
10 . 00 
1.00 
10 . 00 
1.00 
10 . 00 
1.00 
44 . 05 
18.80 
75 .53 
17 .21 
82 .20 
19 . 84 
19 .27 
13 .25 
1. 66 
6.10 
8.96 
9 . 33 
Min 
Max 
7.97 
13.15 
6.01 
12.31 
7 . 58 
12.58 
7.45 
12.24 
5 . 56 
11. 23 
6 . 74 
12.08 
8 . 14 
12 . 28 
7 . 18 
11.82 
0.00 
100 . 00 
0.00 
100 . 00 
0 . 00 
100 . 00 
0.00 
77 . 00 
0 . 00 
64 . 00 
0.00 
50 . 00 
29. as aF 
ax ax ax 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
a Source : National Research Council (1986) . 
b Source: The College Board (1981, 1982, 1986). 
Definition and Conment 
Campus life factor index of sports and performing arts 
reminiscent of a New England Prep school. 
Campus life factor index of sports and performing arts 
depicting a traditional college atmosphere. 
Campus life factor index of sports and performing arts 
dominated by the arts. 
Campus life factor index of sports and performing arts 
weakly portraying the California stereotype . 
Curricular factor index describing a flexible academic 
program. 
Curricular factor index indicating a focus on intensive 
academic programs . 
Curricular factor index portraying a college cooperating 
with the local coomunity. 
Curricular factor index concentrating on traditional 
academic programs. 
Full - time male population per 100 full-time undergradu-
ates .b 
Percentage of associate professors who are male. 8 
Percentage of associate and full professors who are 
tenured. 8 
Percentage of undergraduates who are business majors.b 
Percentage of undergraduates who are engineering majors.b 
Percentage of undergraduates who are education majors.b 
C Source: Academy of American Medical Colleges, Washington, D.C. 
d Source: American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois. 
e Source : AAUP (1982 , 1983) . These figures have been averaged over 2 academic years to partially correct for 
the undue influence in small faculties of the promotion of faculty members into or out of the associate level. 
f Source: Fournier and Rasmussen (1986) have generously provided us with their unpublished cost-of-living 
estimates for all U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) as well as for each state's non-metropolitan area . 
g Source: United States Department of Education (1982) . 
h Undergraduate equivalent population reflects the conversion of full and part-time undergraduate and graduate 
students to a full-time undergraduate student equivalent (FUE) . These sub-populations are weighted according 
to: FUE = [(#FU x 1) + (#PU/ 3) + (#FG x 1 .25) + (#PG/ 3)]; where #FU is a ni.nber of full-time undergradua-
tes, #PU is number of part-time undergraduates, #FG is number of full-time graduates, and #PG is ninber of 
part-time graduates. This full-time equivalent number is used in computing all variables denoted as "per 
student-capita . " 
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adjustment can be cleanl y applied to all e xpenses within a given category . 
For instance, academic expenditure encompasses library acquisitions, the 
prices of which probably reflect a national publishing market. At the same 
time, the academic support line item also includes outlays for library and 
other non-facult y sta f f, e xpenses wh i ch are dominated by local wages. 
Further, the capital stock r ep r esen t s a particularly tough call for a 
v ariet y of reasons. Even though our general cri t erion leads us to deflate 
this variable due to local differences in labor cost, the cost of heavy 
equipment and construction materials might be less locally driven, and 
perhaps especially so in the case of major capital projects . Moreover , even 
if significant local cost differences do exist in the capital expenditure 
area, deflation by a local producer price index, were one available, would 
be preferable . Finally, the analytical benefit attained by adjusting the 
capital stock for local cost-of-living may be relatively modest compared to 
another problem -- the capital stock datum reflects the book value of the 
school's plant . This fact introduces substantial difficulty in comparing 
the real capital stock for two schools of markedly different vintage. 
Tuition and endowment are two variables left in nominal terms . In the 
case of tuition, this seems appropriate because the relative price com-
parisons by prospective students and their parents are comparisons of nomi-
nal tuition costs vis-a - vis their nominal income , irrespective of the region 
where the income is earned. In other words , the choice set of schools open 
to students is not limited to their local or regional schools, and therefore 
nominal differences in tuition should be retained across regions. Regarding 
the endowment , this variable is left in nominal terms because it is used in 
the model as a measure of a earnings potential , the source of which is 
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investment in national financial markets . It would be inappropriate to 
adjust the value of the endowment itself for local cost-of-living because 
this would in turn alter its earnings stream, which is unrelated to local 
conditions . Of course, once the purchasing power of the endowment manifests 
itself as expenditure , it is cost-of-living adjusted; but this does not 
warrant altering the endowment base upon which the earnings accrue. 
Another set of variables from Table 3 merit special attention . Recall 
from Section 2 that indexes of campus life (Campus 1 _ 4 ) and special cur-
ricular offerings (CURR1 _ 4 ) are included in the model. All eight of the 
indexes are placed in the student equation reflecting the assumption that 
students' choices are influenced by the academic as well as social breadth 
of an institution. Given the academic orientation of the output variable, 
only the curricular indexes are included in the output equation. 
The indexes have been obtained by exploratory factor analysis. 23 
Tables 4 and 5 provide a descriptive overview of the variables used to 
construct the campus life and academic indexes, respectively. The tables 
list the specific institutional program, that program's correlation with the 
factor index, and the proportion of the sample schools offering the program. 
For clarity, only programs with a correlation of at least 0.30 with the 
factor index are included in the table . In the case of the campus life 
23 Technically, a principal components factor analysis was employed with 
varimax orthogonal rotation. We allowed the procedure to continue extract-
ing common factors for the curricular indexes until the eigenvalue for the 
last factor fell below 1.0. While sixteen campus life indeAes were 
extracted using this criterion, the latter factors had little intuitive 
appeal. Experimentation with additional campus life indexes indicated that 
they added very little to the model. 
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indexes, Table 4 also notes that these attributes fall generally between 
the two broad categories of sports (S) and performing arts (A). 
Although intuitive interpretations of factor indexes are seldom pure, 
inspection of the contents of each index does suggest some meaningful quali-
tative distinctions. The clearest examples lie in the campus life indexes. 
First observe how Indexes #l & #2 are generally sports dominated, as com-
pared with the performing arts orientation of Index #3, "Artsy". Even 
within the sports domain in general, however, there is a rather intriguing 
difference in the socioeconomic orientation of students likely to be 
attracted by the respective sports menus . Considering the list of sports 
for Index #l --lacrosse, ice hockey, fencing, sailing -- the image of the 
affluent "New England Prep" is difficult to suppress. In contrast, Index #2 
connotes a more traditional sports core, one more closely associated with 
"Joe College". And while we might be stretching the point, Index #4 is 
reminiscent of the "California" stereotype with squash, water polo, diving, 
and choreographed ensembles. Overall, the character of the indicators 
included within the respective Campus life indexes suggests that traceable 
differences exist across institutions in terms of campus life, and thus it 
is desirable to capture these when modeling student choice. We shall not, 
however, hypothesize regarding the signs of the relationships between such 
institutional differences and student quality as measured by SAT score. 
Compared to the campus life indexes, the curricular indexes are con-
siderably less tidy from the standpoint of intuitive interpretation. This 
may arise from the fact that the factor analysis is not operating with the 
same potential diversity within curricular programs across schools as exists 
in sports and performing arts. Nevertheless, Index #l seems to reflect 
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Table 4: Correlations Between Campus Life Indices 
and their Observed Indicator Variables 
Factor Index fl 1 : NE Pree Factor Index# 2: Joe College 
Corr . Corr. 
with Sample with Sample 
Di chotomous Variable Index ~ Dichotomous Variable Index _f.rQ.E.,_ 
S : Lacrosse 0 .7 4 0.2 8 S : Baseball 0 . 68 0.79 
S : Rugby 0 . 67 0 . 22 S: Football 0.68 0.80 
S : Ice Hockey 0 . 59 0.25 Greek System 0 . 63 0.58 
S : Swillllling 0 . 59 0.18 S: Golf 0.63 0.82 
S : Field Hockey 0 . 51 0 . 42 S : Wrestling 0 . 48 0 . 44 
S : Fencing 0 . 48 0 . 24 S: Bowling 0.40 0 . 56 
S : Sailing 0 . 48 0 . 19 A: Pop Band 0 . 38 0 . 46 
A: Dance 0 . 46 0.51 S: Softball 0 . 32 0.96 
S : Skiing 0 . 42 0 . 35 S : Track 0.30 0 . 67 
S : Horseback Riding 0 . 35 0.15 
S : Water Polo 0.33 0.22 
S : Paddleball 0.31 0.17 
Factor Index fl. 3 : Artsi Factor Index# 4 : California 
Corr . Corr. 
with Sample with Sample 
Di chotomous Variable Index ~ Dichotomous Variable ~ _f.rQ.E.,_ 
A: Concert Band 0 . 75 0.58 S: Squash 0 . 72 0.66 
A: Jazz Band 0 . 67 0 . 55 S : Diving 0.71 0.34 
A: Marching Band 0 . 58 0.16 S : Water Polo 0 . 57 0 . 22 
A: Symphony Orch . 0 . 55 0 . 47 A : Music Ensembles 0.39 0. 72 
A: Music Ensembles 0. 52 Cl. 72 
A: Opera 0 . 46 0 . 21 
S: Track 0 . 46 0.67 
A: Pop Band 0 . 32 0 . 46 
The following indicators had correlations less than 0.30 with each of the factor indexes . Th
e proportion of 
schools offering the activity is noted parenthetically. Conrnunications and Publications: pap
er (0 . 99), 
magazine (0.69) , yearbook (0.97), radio (0 . 69), TV (0 .23), and film (0.20). Performing Arts: choral 
(0 . 98), drama (0 . 98), and theater (0 . 69) . Soorts: archery (0.24), badminton (0 . 43), basketball (0.99), 
boxing (0 . 04), cross-country (0.74), gymnastics (0.26), handball (0 . 38), racquetball (0.46), rifle (0.14), 
rowing (0.12) , skin diving (0.07) , soccer (0.82), table tennis (0 . 42), tennis (0.99), and volleyball (0 .99). 
Table 5: Correlations Between Curricular Indices 
and their Observed Indicator Variables 
Factor Index fl. 1: Flexible Factor Index# 2: Depth 
Corr. Corr. 
with Sample with 
Dichotomous Variable Index _f.rQ.E.,_ Dichotomous Variable Index 
Internships 0 . 74 0 . 90 3-2 Lib. Arts & Career 0.67 
Independent Study 0 . 68 0 . 94 Study Abroad 0.65 
Student-Designed Major 0 . 60 0 . 68 Honors Program 0 . 43 
Double Major 0 . 36 0 . 86 Other 0.41 
Double Major 0.36 
Sample 
_f.rQ.E.,_ 
0 . 63 
0 . 86 
0.60 
0.42 
0 . 86 
Factor Index fl. 3: Local Factor Index# 4: Academic 
Corr . Corr. 
with Sample with Sample 
Dichotomous Variable Index _f.rQ.E.,_ Dichotomous Variable ~ Prop. 
Cooperative Education 0 . 75 0 . 27 Accelerated Program 
0.68 0 . 56 
Honors Program 0.54 0.60 Other 
-0.54 0 . 42 
Cross -Registration 0 . 53 0 . 57 Double Major 0 . 46 0.86 
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curricular "Flexibility" by virtue of internships, independent study, and 
student-designed majors. Index #2 captures a slightly different dimension 
of curricular "Depth" in the form of the five-year arts & career, study 
abroad, and honors programs. The images implied by Indexes #3 and #4 are 
less focused , however. Index #3 has been labeled "Local" because of the 
availability of cooperative education (alternating full-time periods of 
study and work) and cross-registration with other universities, but the 
strength of an honors program in this index muddies the water. Finally, one 
might interpret Index #4 as traditionally "Academic" because of the avail-
ability of accelerated programs and double majors, as well as the negative 
correlation with "other programs". 
Regarding the predicted signs on the curricular indexes, one would 
expect generally positive relationships in the student equation. The signs 
in the output equation are indeterminate, however. Again, this ambiguity 
can be traced to the emphasis on graduate training in the output variable. 
For example, consider how the specific programs contained in Indexes #land 
#2 are likely to have mixed impacts from the standpoint of fostering 
graduate study. Note that these indexes contain programs of a career 
orientation directly following the baccalaureate degree (internships, 3-2 
Liberal Arts & Career) as well as programs more inclined to stimulate a 
student toward graduate school (e.g. independent study, honors program). 
Given the nature of our output measure, the efficacy of career-oriented 
programs at the undergraduate level would tend to depress production, while 
curricular offerings such as an honor program would probably contribute. 
4. Empirical Results 
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Discussion of the results is developed on two levels. First, the 
results of the expanded model are interpreted, giving particular emphasis to 
the relative productivity of the significant inputs. These results are 
also compared with the findings of our earlier study. Second, two sets of 
comparative estimations are performed with the expanded model. These com-
parisons are presented to demonstrate the sensitivity of the parameter 
estimates to: 1) quality adjustment of the output variable, and 2) local 
cost-of-living adjustment of expenditure variables. 
4.1 Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
The results of the three-stage least-squares estimation appear in the 
first column of Table 6. Inspection of the output equation (Q) confirms 
the strong quantitative and statistical significance of faculty quality, 
academic expenditure, and faculty-student ratio. Student quality is also 
revealed to be important, although it is somewhat surprising that this 
variable is of only border line significance. Perhaps the most conspicuous 
non-result is the apparent insignificance of capital in the output equation. 
In part, this result may flow from the problems of capital stock valuation 
noted earlier. Also, it turns out that the performance of the capital stock 
variable is quite sensitive to local cost-of-living adjustment, as shall be 
revealed in the next section . Generally, the curricular indexes suggest 
that differences in program offerings are relatively inconsequential. Only 
CURR3 is significant, and weakly so at that. Finally, note the consistent 
performance of the control variables in the output equation. As hypothe-
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sized, relatively high proportions of undergraduate business or engineering 
majors reduce an institution's production of Ph.D./M.D . /J.D . alumni for 
reasons unrelated to institutional quality. 
Thus, overall, the parameters in the output equation suggest a rather 
plausible, indeed traditional, recipe for undergraduate education -- a rela-
tively high ratio of quality faculty to good students in a facilitating 
environment reflected by academic expenditure. A numerical example is 
useful in demonstrating the relative efficacy of additional expenditure on 
these statistically significant inputs. For illustration, consider a school 
of 1,000 full-time undergraduates which has the average faculty-student 
ratio (55 faculty members) and pays the average faculty compensation 
($26,740) for the schools in the sample. Further assume an institutional 
objective to raise output by 10 doctoral degrees per 100 students. Based on 
the parameter estimates, this policy would require increasing academic 
expenditure by $1.6 million, all other inputs held constant. 24 This same 
outcome could also be achieved by altering the faculty-student ratio . 
Holding faculty quality constant (i.e. continuing to pay the average faculty 
compensation), this strategy would mean doubling faculty size from 55 to 
109, with an implied cost of $1.45 million. A third alternative would be to 
raise faculty quality, holding faculty size constant, at a cost of $0.28 
million. Note that of the three options, improving faculty quality is the 
24 For example, this result is obtained as follows. The 6.21 coef~ 
ficient implies that a $1,000 per student increase in academic expenditure 
will result in a long-run (10 years) increase of 6.21 doctoral degrees per 
100 enrolled students. For a school size of 1,000 the $1,000 per student 
increase translates into a $1 million expenditure. Finally, to raise the 
level by 10 instead of 6.21 the required increase is $1 million x (10/6.21), 
or $1.6 million. 
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Table 6: Results of Three-Stage Least-Squares Estimation 
Coefficients & (t-values) Elasticities at the Sample Means* 
Current Study: Current Study : Earlier Study: 
Q = PhDs + MDs + JDs; n 2 361 Q = PhDs + MDs + JDs ; n=361 Q = PhDs; n=l74 
Q s F Q s F Q s F 
Output (Q ) 2 . 3lt 0 . 06t 0.03t 0.04t -0 . 04 0 . 01 
(2 . 72) ( 1. 74 J 
Stud ents (SJ 0.04t 0.02* 2 . 86t 0 . 67* -1.76 0 . 89* 
(1. 80) (3.86) 
Faculty (F) 1. 95t 12 . 55. 3 . 23* o . 3o* 2.46t a . so* 
(3.84) (3 . 85) 
Capital (K) 0.15 l . 83t -o . 11f 0 . 12 o.02f -o . ost 0 . 10 0 . 03t -0 . 01• 
(1. 02) (1. 69) (2 . 42) 
Academic 6. 51 t - 18 . 60 0 . 09 0 . 11* -0 . 01 0 . 00 0.16* o.ozt -0 . 01 
(AC) (3.03) (1.06) (0.13) 
Administration 0.47 0 . 05 0.53* 
(AD) (0 . 67) 
Research (RE) -0.14 0.07t -0.01 o . oof 0 . 00 
(1.14) (2.28) 
Tuition (I) 13 . 10* o .os* 0 . 14* 
(3.22) 
Scholarships -0 . 30* -0.01* -0 . 03t 
(SCH) (2 . 76) 
% on Scholar- -o . 11 -0 . 00 
ship (%SCH) (0.50) 
Loans (L) -0 . 00 
Endowment (E) 0 . 06* 0. 04 t o . os* 
(3.13) 
Faculty/Stud . 1.91* -4 . 72 -0 . 25 0 . 66t -a.oz -0 . 05 1. oo* 0.13* -0. 14 t 
Ratio (FSR) (3.54) (1.05) ( 1. 56) 
Instrct . /Stud . 1.69 0 . 35 -0 . 65t 0 . 06 0 . 00 -o . 01f 
Ratio (!SR ) (1. 34) (0 . 04) (1 . 80) 
Undergraduate -0 . 03 -0.25 0 . 00 -0.15 -0 . 02 0 . 01 1.21* o . 1s* -o . 1s* 
Spec . (USR) (0.81) (0 . 93) (0 . 27) 
Campus #1 -0 . 04 -0 . 00 
(NE Prep) (0.01) 
Campus #2 -0 . 09 -0 . 00 
(Joe College) (0 . 03) 
Campus #3 3 . 72 0 . 03 
(Artsy) (1.24) 
Campus #4 -2 . 81 -a.oz 
(California) (0 . 94) 
Curricular #1 -0 . 58 8.0lf - 0 . 36 0 . 07t 
(Flexible) (0 . 81) (2 . 25) 
Curricular #2 -o . 48 7 . 26t -0 . 30 0 . 06t 
(Depth) (0 . 77) (1. 97) (continued) 
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Table 6: Results of Three-Stage Least-Squares Estimation (Continued) 
Curricular #3 
( Local) 
Curricular #4 
(Academic) 
% Male Stud ' s 
(%MSTUD) 
% Male Assoc. 
Fae . (%MFAC) 
% Tenured Sen . 
Fae. (%TEN) 
% Business 
Maj's (%BUS) 
% Engineering 
Maj' s (%ENG) 
% Education 
Maj 's (%ED) 
North Atlantic 
(NA) 
Great Lakes 
(GL) 
Western (W) 
Constant 
Mean 
Std Dev. 
Std Error 
2S ResCor 
3S ResCor 
Coefficients & Ct-values) 
Current Study : 
Q = PhDs + MDs + JDs ; n•361 
Q 
1.02t 
(2 . 08) 
-0.81 
(1.66) 
0 . 16* 
(4 . 62) 
-0 .21* 
(3 . 61) 
-0.29* 
(3 . 36) 
-0.02 
(0.31) 
-90 . 11 t 
(6.71) 
16 . 12 
15.50 
10 .00 
1.00 
-0.34 
-0 . 32 
1.00 
0.23 
-0 . 14 
s 
-3 . 46 
(1 . 10) 
4 . 09 
(1. 30) 
-0.22 
(0. 71) 
578 . 50* 
(5 .20) 
1122 .91 
106 . 93 
72 . 54 
1.00 
-0.60 
1.00 
0.17 
F 
o.02t 
(1.88) 
0 . 01 
( 1. 58) 
o . 02t 
(1. 75) 
o.os* 
(2.76) 
-0 . 03t 
(1 . 81) 
6 . 94 
(1. 50) 
26 . 74 
3 . 81 
2 . 84 
1.00 
1.00 
Elasticities at the Sample Means* 
Current Study : 
Q • PhDs + MDs + JDs; n•361 
Q s 
0 . 63t 
-0 . 03 
-o. 50 0.04 
-0 . 00 
- 0 . 01 
16 . 12 1122.91 
15 . 50 106 .93 
10 . 00 72.54 
1 .00 
-0 . 34 
-0 . 32 
1.00 
0 .23 
-0 . 14 
1.00 
-0 .60 
1.00 
0 . 17 
F 
0 . 02 
o.02t 
o.oo* 
26.74 
3.81 
2 . 84 
1.00 
1.00 
Earlier Study: 
Q • PhDs; n• 174 
Q s 
0 . 26t 
11 . 84 1040 . 74 
8.01 109.48 
5 . 20 68.28 
1.00 
0 . 43 
-0.44 
1.00 
-0 . 80 
F 
o . oot 
23.45 
2.62 
1. 93 
1 . 00 
* Beyond extending the sample and revising the model, a number of definitional changes have been made be-
tween the earlier and current studies. Q now includes M.D.' s and J .D. 'a as well aa Ph.D.'s; Q adjusts 
Ph .D. 's for quality of the graduate program; and Q excludes Ph .D. 's obtained in non-ranked fields. Fur-
thermore, the denominator for Q is now full-time undergraduates rather than full-time undergraduate equiv-
alents . Sis now third-quartile instead of median SAT. F now includes pecuniary fringe benefits as well 
as salary . F, K, AC, AD, and RE have been adjusted for geographic cost-of-living differences . Conse-
quently, regional binaries (NE, GL, W) are no longer used. SCH is now measured in terms of percentage of 
tuition for each scholarship recipient rather than $1 , 000 per student-capita. The denaninator for USR has 
been changed from full-time undergraduate equivalents to total number of students. 
Denotes significance at the 0 . 05 level 
Denotes significance at the 0 . 01 level 
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most cost-effective choice by a substantial margin. However, the policy 
implication of this finding should not be misconstrued. It does not mean 
that increases in compensation across an existing faculty is the most effi-
cient means to enhance institutional output. Rather, this result means that 
it is most cost-effective in the long run to raise compensation in order to 
attract better faculty, and equivalently, to retain quality faculty who 
would move without higher compensation. The policy significance of the 
latter point is perhaps especially pertinent if quality faculty are con-
sidering leaving academe altogether, rather than moving between institu-
tions . 
Technically, of course, the calculations performed in the above example 
are implicitly ceteris paribus estimates, and thus do not capture the endog-
enous effects of changing the level of any significant input. For example, 
examine the parameters in the student equation. Observe that raising 
faculty quality is also predicted to raise student quality, which in turn 
has separate positive output effects . In other words, the ceteris paribus 
examples are effective in assessing relative factor impacts, but in an 
absolute sense, the examples slightly overstate the estimated cost due to 
endogenous impacts which are ignored. 
The fact that endogeneity is an important dimension when modeling the 
educational process is amply demonstrated by the significance of all three 
endogenous variables across the output, student and faculty equations. 
Furthermore , the results confirm the cross-equation correlation of error as 
a source of bias in OLS estimates. The last two items in Table 6 present 
error correlation matrices following the second and third-stage estimations. 
Observe that while relatively high cross-equation error-correlation is 
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apparent in the second stage, the magnitude of the correlation is substan-
tial reduced in the third stage, especially between the faculty and student 
equations where it is most serious. 
Although they are of secondary importance to the output equation, the 
student and faculty equations each invite some interesting interpretations. 
The parameters for the student quality equation indicate that better stu-
dents are drawn to schools by output, the capital plant, faculty quality, 
and curricular flexibility (CURR1 ) and depth (CURR2 ). As in output equa-
tion, faculty quality again shows a large quantitative impact on student 
quality -- a $1,000 increase in associate professor compensation is esti-
mated to raise third quartile SAT score of the entering class by more than 
12 points in the long run. Better students also appear to be influenced by 
the physical amenities of the campus as measured here by the value of the 
capital stock, although the capital coefficient is only weakly significant. 
The campus life indexes are revealed to be uniformly insignificant. A 
plausible interpretation of this result is simply that quality students are 
not oriented disproportionately to any particular sports or artistic dimen-
sion. 
Somewhat striking at first blush is the negative significance of 
scholarships on student quality. However, as suggested in Section 2, the 
Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) finding may be surfacing here as well, albeit 
in a slightly different context since our sample contains a much broader 
range of institutional quality. 25 It is conceivable that less highly 
25 Recall, the Ehrenberg and Sherman study examined the efficacy of 
Cornell's financial aid strategy relative to a select group of Ivy League 
competitors. 
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regarded institutions use the financial lure more extensively, but neverthe-
less , remain relatively unsuccessful bidders. This logical thread might 
also extend to account for the seemingly perverse relationship suggested by 
the positive sign of the tuition coefficient in the student equation. If 
tuition is perceived as a true index of institutional quality, one would 
expect to find better students at more expensive schools . Indeed, tuition 
differences may be capturing qualitative differences which are not expli-
citly included in the student equation. In essence, the strongly positive 
influence of tuition on student quality may be symptomatic of omitted vari-
ables in this segment of the model. Broader implications of this finding 
will be developed further in the final section . 
Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that the faculty equation in 
our model was described as a reduced-form equation from a supply-and-demand 
system for faculty quality. Generally, the results support this interpreta-
tion. Observe that, from a supply perspective, institutional output, qual-
ity students and the financial security of a school's endowment are all 
significant factors drawing quality faculty . However, from a factor demand 
standpoint, the resource trade-off between well-paid faculty and competing 
inputs is evident from the significant negative coefficients on instructor-
student ratio (ISR) and the capital plant. For example, a one percentage 
point increase in ISR is predicted to cost associate professors $650 in 
annual compensation. Similarly, the negative and significant sign on 
capital suggests that the quality of physical facilities serves as a sub-
stitute for quality faculty. Also note that the control variables in the 
faculty equation perform consistently with our theoretical intent. The 
signs and significance of percent business (+), engineering(+), and educa-
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tion (-) majors suggest that the parameter estimates in the output equation 
are appropriately adjusted for differences in compensation due to segmented 
labor markets rather than true faculty quality. 
From a general modeling perspective, it is particularly instructive to 
compare the results of the current model with our earlier study. Since the 
model has been improved in ways enumerated in the table notes, it is more 
meaningful to compare elasticities rather than the coefficients themselves . 
The elasticities from the respective estimations are presented in the second 
and third columns of Table 6. 
Considering that we have broadened our output measure and sharpened the 
model in many other respects, the robustness of the findings is gratifying, 
if not remarkable. For example, the importance of faculty quality, academic 
expenditure, and the faculty/student ratio remain highly significant in the 
output equations. Moreover, even the elasticities themselves are reasonably 
consister~ across the rwo estimations. However, the current results are 
quite superior in an important respect -- one sees considerably stronger 
evidence of endogeneity between the output, student, and faculty equations. 
In the current results, the endogenous variables are statistically signi-
ficant in all six occurrences, in fact, at the one-percent significance 
level in four cases. Compare these results with the previous study in which 
the bulk of the endogeneity revolved around faculty quality. Indeed, the 
generally weak role of student quality was a major surprise in the earlier 
results . 
Conceptually, the enhanced role of student quality throughout the 
present model seems quite consistent with improvements in the operational 
definitions of two of the endogenous variables. First, recall that student 
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quality is now measured by third-quartile SAT score rather than median 
score. Focus on the upper tail of a school's aptitude distribution is 
appropriate given the relatively high achievement orientation of the career 
paths represented in the output variable. Second, expanding the breadth of 
alumni achievement to include M.D.'s and J.D. 's, as well as the quality 
adjustment of Ph . D. 's, should improve the sensitivity of the output variable 
to varying student quality . Both of these adjustments are plausible, if not 
compelling, explanations for the heightened significance of student quality 
in the model. 
The only variable losing significance in the current study is admini-
strative support. While the careful reader might also cite the uniform 
change in the status of undergraduate specialization ratio, this result in 
the earlier study was probably largely the result of a misspecification 
which has been remedied. 26 
4.2 Significance of Ph.D. Quality and Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
Section 2 discussed the potential importance within our model of two 
data refinements. First , the Ph.D. component of the output variable (Q) has 
been adjusted for quality differences across graduate programs. Because the 
college output measure is couched in terms of academic quality, weighting 
Ph.D.'s from superior graduate programs more highly is, in our judgement, an 
important refinement of Q. The second adjustment attempts to remove geo-
graphical cost-of-living differences from faculty compensation and selected 
26 Because per capita adjustment of Q was based on full-time equivalent 
students rather than actual full-time undergraduates, the significance of 
the undergraduate specialization ratio was almost tautological. 
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university expenditures. It is obviously preferable that differential 
expenditures across universities reflect real disparities rather than mere 
price differences. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the sen-
sitivity of the results to these two refinements. We consider the Ph.D. 
quality adjustment and cost-of-living adjustment in turn. 
Table 7 presents three sets of three-stage least-squares estimates for 
the Q, Sand F equations . The first set replicates the results from Table 6 
as a basis for comparison. The second set utilizes the same model but 
redefines Q such that the Ph . D. component is not quality adjusted. The 
third set goes one step further by including Ph.D. 's achieved in fields 
which previously had to be excluded from Q due to the unavailability of 
program rankings in the Jones-Lindzey-Coggeshall study. Recall, these 
fields include agriculture, health sciences, professional fields such as 
business, and predominantly education. The averages for these alternative 
Q's are 15.7, 15.6 and 18.6, respectively. The similarity between the first 
two averages is the intended result of our scaling the quality weighting 
index to have a unitary mean across the 361 schools in our sample . Conse-
quently, the output measures have comparable interpretations -- the per-
student-capita number of doctoral degrees achieved by baccalaureate alumni 
per decade. The advantage of the first definition over the others is that 
it measures equal-quality Ph.D. degrees. The twenty percent higher average 
of the third output measure (All Ph.D . 's) reflects the substantial number of 
doctorates attained in unranked fields. This comparison alone is perhaps 
suggestive of the potential importance of distinguishing quality from quan-
tity in identifying the relative productivities of inputs in institutional 
production. 
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Table 7: Adjusting Ph.D.'s for Quality Differences in Graduate Programs; 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Results With and Without Adjustment 
PhD's : With Quality Adj.; Phd's : No Quality Adj . ; Phd's: No Quality Adj.; 
Ranked Fields Only Ranked Fields Only All Fields 
Coeffi cients & Ct-values) Coefficien t s & Ct-values) Coefficients & (t-values) 
Q s F Q s F Q s F 
Output (Q ) 2 . 31* 0 . 06t 2.24t 0 . 07t l . 8lt 0 . 04 
(2 . 72) ( 1. 74) (2 .23) (1. 91) (2.02) (1 . 28) 
Students (S J 0 . 04t 0.02* 0 . 02 0 . 02* 0.02 0 . 02* 
(1 . 80) (3 . 86) (1.05) (3 . 95) (0 . 99) (4.46) 
Faculty (F) 1. 95* 12.55* 1. 96* 13 . 37t 1 . s5* 13. get 
(3 . 84) (3.85) (4 . 36) (4 . 06) (3.73) (4.36) 
Capital CK) 0.15 1. 83 t -0 . llt 0.24t 1.83 -o . 12t 0 . 23 2 . oof -0.12* 
( 1. 02) Cl . 69) (2.42) (1. 81) (1. 63) (2 . 61) (1. 58) (1 . 79) (2. 64) 
Academi c 6 . 51* -18 . 60 0 . 09 4 . 92t -13 . 73 0.15 5.so* -13 . 20 0 . 27 
(AC) (3.03) Cl . 06) (0 . 13) (2.55) (0 . 79) (0.22) (2 . 75) (0.74) (0 . 41) 
Administration 0. 47 0 . 23 0 . 62 
(AD) (0 . 67) (0 . 35) (0.83) 
Research (RE) -0 . 14 0 . 07t -0 . 13 o , 01f -0 . 09 o.01f 
( 1. 14) (2 . 28) (1.18) (2.28) (0 . 71) (2 . 25) 
Tuition (T) 13 . 10* 14 . 37t 14 . 70t 
(3.22) (3 . 48) (3 . 55) 
Scholarships -0 . 30t -0 . 33t -0.33t 
(SCH) (2 . 76) (2 . 90) (2 . 90) 
% on Scholar- -0 . 11 -0 . 10 -0 . 15 
ship (%SCH) (0 . 50) (0 . 45) (0 . 66) 
Endowment (E) o . 06* o . os* 0 . 01* 
(3 . 13) (3 . 33) (3. 63) 
Faculty/Stud . l . 91t -4 . 72 -0 . 25 1. 59t -4.04 -0 . 25 l.90t -3 . 62 -0.24 
Ratio (FSR) (3. 54) (1 . 05) ( 1. 56) (3 . 48) (0.89) ( 1. 55) (3 . 60) (0 . 79) (l. 47) 
Instrct . /Stud . 1. 69 0 . 35 -0 . 65t 1 . 50 0 , 77 - 0 . 64t 1. 72 0.80 -0.66t 
Ratio (ISR) (1 . 34) (0 . 04 ) (1 . 80) (1. 32) (0 . 08) (1. 77) (1. 39) (0.08) ( 1. 82) 
Undergraduate -0 . 03 -0 . 25 0 . 00 -o . 05 -0 . 21 0 . 00 -0 . 05 -0 . 24 0 . 00 
Spec . (USR) (0 . 81 ) (0 . 93) (0 . 27) (1.34) (0 . 78) (0 . 28) Cl . 44) (0 . 88) (0 . 23) 
Campus #1 -0 . 04 -0 . 56 0 . 47 
(NE Prep) (0 . 01) (0 . 12) (0.10) 
Campus #2 -0.09 -0 . 17 -0 . 00 
(Joe College) (0 . 03) (0.05) (0.00) 
Campus #3 3 . 72 3 . 82 4 . 87 
(Artsy) ( l. 24) ( 1. 22) (1. 55) 
Campus #4 -2 . 81 -3 . 44 -2 . 91 
(California) (0 . 94) (1.12) (0.95) 
( continued) 
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Table 7: Adjusting Ph.D.'s for Quality Differences in Graduate Programs; 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Results Yith and Without Adjustment 
(Continued) · 
PhD's: With Quality Adj .; Phd's : No Quality Adj.; Phd's : No Quality Adj . ; 
Ranked Fields Only Ranked Fields Only All Fields 
Coefficients & Ct- v alues) Coeffi ci ents & ( t-values) Coefficients & Ct-values) 
Q s F Q s F Q s F 
Cur r icular #1 -0 . 58 8 . 0lt -0 . 26 7 . 78t -0.36 7 . 22t 
(Flexible) (0 . 81) (2 . 25) (0 . 41) (2 . 18) (0 . 51) (2.08) 
Curricular #2 -o. 48 7 . 26t -0.11 6 . 48t -0 . 14 6 . 74t 
(Depth) (0 . 77) ( 1. 97) (0.20) (1. 74) (0.23) ( 1. 86) 
Curricular #3 1.ozt -3.46 1.oot -3.47 l.09t -3 . 01 
(Local) (2 . 08) (1 . 10) (2.31) ( 1.10) (2 . 28) (0 . 98) 
Curricular #4 -0 . 81 4 . 09 -0 .73 4 . 02 -0.69 3 . 09 
(Academic) (1. 66) ( 1. 30) (1.68) (1.27) ( 1. 45) (1 . 02) 
% Male Stud ' s 0 . 16* - 0 . 22 0 . 17* -0 .24 0 . 20* -0.17 
(%MSTUDJ (4.62) (0 . 71) (5.60) (0.73) (5.83) (0 . 53) 
% Male Assoc . o . 02t o.02t o.02t 
Fae . (%MFACJ (1 . 88) (1. 86) (2 . 18) 
% Tenured Sen. 0 . 01 0 . 01 O. Olt 
Fae . (%TEN) (1. 58) (1 .65) (1. 77) 
% Business -0 . 21* o.02t -o .21 t 0 . 02 -0.23t 0 . 02 
Maj 's (%BUS) (3 . 61) ( 1. 75) (3 .95) (1.60) (3.96) ( 1. 39 J 
% Engineering -0.29* 0 . 06* -o.2s* o . 06* -0.33t 0 . 06t 
Maj 's (%ENG) (3 . 36) (2 . 76) (3.54) (2 . 76) (3. 77 J (2.67) 
% Education -0 . 02 -0 . 03t -0 .04 -0 .03t -0 . 03 -0 . 04t 
Maj ' s ( %ED) (0.31) (1. Bl) (0 . 62) ( 1. 70) (0.42) (2 . 17) 
Constant - 90.11* 576 . 50* 6 . 94 -74.43* 567 .92* 6 .99 -71 . 64 t 527 . B9t 5 . 31 
(6 . 71) (5 . 20) Cl . 50) (6.16) (4 . 97) (1. 55) (5 . 43) (4 . 68) (1 . 23) 
Mean 16 . 12 1122 . 91 26 . 74 15 . 56 1122 . 91 26 .74 16.62 1122.91 26 . 74 
Std Dev . 15 . 50 106 . 93 3.61 13 . 99 106 . 93 3 . 61 14.79 106 . 93 3 . 61 
Std Error 10 . 00 72 . 54 2 . 64 9 . 23 73 . 31 2 . 64 9.91 74.04 2.64 
2S ResCor 1.00 1.00 1.00 
-0 . 34 1 . 00 -0 .27 1.00 0 . 22 1.00 
-0 . 32 -0.60 1.00 -0 . 36 -0 . 61 1.00 - 0 . 32 -0 . 65 1.00 
3S ResCor 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 . 23 1.00 0 . 31 1.00 0.28 1.00 
-0 . 14 0 . 17 1.00 -0 . 03 0.25 1.00 -0.02 0 . 16 1.00 
Denotes significance at the 0 . 05 level 
Denotes significance at the 0 . 01 level 
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Observe from Table 7 that quality adjustment appears to exert its 
strongest influence on core variables in the model - - output, student 
quality, capital, and academic expenditure. Indeed, the role of student 
quality declines markedly in the output equation when Ph.D. 's are not 
qualit y -adjusted . This diminished importance is evidenced by a 50 percent 
reduction in the coefficient on S (from 0 . 04 when quality-adjusted to 0.02 
without adjustment) as well as by a loss of statistical significance. 
Academic expenditure, while remaining statistically significant, suffers a 
20 percent drop in the coefficient. Considered together these results 
suggest that certain inputs are especially important in producing quality. 
It is somewhat surprising, however, that the impact of faculty quality is 
virtually unaffected by quality adjustment. Note that both the coefficient 
and t-statistic for Fin the Q equation are remarkable stable using either 
output measure. The changes with respect to faculty quantity (FSR) · are 
negligible as well. 27 Perhaps most surprising, however, are the seemingly 
perverse changes occuring with respect to the capital stock. When output is 
not quality adjusted, the capital stock becomes half again as important 
quantitatively and rises to statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
But upon adding unranked fields to output, capital's coefficient then de-
clines slightly and returns to insignificance. Interpretated at face value, 
this pattern implies that the physical amenities of a campus are more impor-
27 While this is true, the last set of results must be qualified since 
the inclusion of the unranked Ph.D. fields increases Q by about 20 percent 
on average. If this increase were merely a matter of rescaling, then one 
might expect the coefficients to rise by about 20 percent vis-a-vis the second 
set of results. Since, for example, the F coefficient actually declines by 
about 6 percent, one might infer that faculty quality is noticeably less 
important in producing Ph.D.'s in the unranked fields. 
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tant in producing numbers of doctoral - achieving alumni than they are in 
enhancing the quality of those doctoral degrees. 28 
From the perspective of the input equations, quality adjustment within 
Q is of only marginal importance in drawing quality students or faculty. 
The Q coefficients and t -values change only slightl y between the first two 
sets of results. Nor does i ncluding unranked Ph . D. fields appear to in-
fluence student quality. In fact , observe that the 23 percent decline in 
the Q coefficients (from 2.24 to 1.81) within the S equation is approxi-
mately offset by the 20 percent average increase in Q (from 15.58 to 18.62) 
between the last two sets of results . The same cannot be said for the 
faculty equations, however. The Q coefficient drops by a disproportionate 
43 percent (from 0 . 07 to 0.04) and declines to statistical insignificance in 
the third set of results as well . To the extent that average compensation 
reflects faculty quality, producing Ph.D. alumni in unranked fields is less 
of a magnet in attracting quality faculty than Ph . D. production in ranked 
disciplines, ceteris paribus . 
The lessons of the adjustment for differential quality among graduate 
Ph.D. programs can be restated succinctly. The quality of students at a 
university is much more important in influencing the quality of graduate 
degrees than it is in affecting their quantity. To a lesser extent, this is 
also true for academic expenditure . Just the opposite case applies for 
capital, -- it is apparently more important in producing quantity than 
28 Actually, the marginal productivity of capital with respect to the quality 
of the graduate program appears to be negative. We would not press this 
point, however. Indeed, it is precisely this kind of unstable behavior which 
leads us to speculate about a broader structure for the model in general . 
We shall return to this issue in the conclusions . 
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quality. The quality adjustment plays no substantive role in drawing 
quality students or faculty, but not all Ph.D. fields attract equal-quality 
faculty . 
Although the preceding lessons are interesting, one might have anti-
cipated more pervasive and dramatic differences resulting from quality 
adjustment. But in fact, it is quite amazing that differences surfaced at 
all; the simple correlation between the quality-adjusted and unadjusted 
numbers of Ph.D . 's turns out to be an astonishing 0.988 . This extraordi -
nary correlation is especially surprising in light of the relatively low 
correlation of 0.518 between the unadjusted numbers of Ph . D.'s and the 
quality index used for weighting those doctorates. The explanation for this 
rise in correlation is mechanical . The relatively high variation in Ph . D. 
numbers (with a standard deviation which is 96 percent of its mean of 6.28) 
dominates the quality index (with a standard deviation 17 percent of its 
mean value of unity) when the two are multiplied together. Ex post, the 
relatively low dispersion within the program-quality rankings is really 
quite understandable. This result is common in survey instruments using 
ordinal rankings (0 - 5 in this particular case). Under such a format, survey 
respondents have a tendency to render middling ranks in all but the truly 
extraordinary cases . 
Table 8 reveals the significance of geographical cost-of-living (COL) 
adjustment. Again, three sets of results are presented . The first set 
replicates the results from Table 6. In this case, faculty compensation 
(F), the value of the capital plant (K), academic expenditure (AC), admini-
strative expenditure (AD) , and research expenditure (RE) are all adjusted 
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Table 8: Effects of Adjusting$ for Local Cost-of-Living Differences; 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Results With and Without Adjustment 
Basic Model: COL Adjustments No COL Adjustments COL Adjustments to 
to F, K, AC, AD, RE F , AC, AD, RE 
Coefficients & (t-values) Coefficients & Ct-values) Coefficients & (t-values) 
Q s F Q s F Q s F 
Output (Q) 2 . 31* 0 . 06t l.62t 0 . 02 l. 43 0.07t 
(2 . 72) ( l. 74) (2 . 00) (0 . 43) ( l. 55) (2 . 04) 
Students (S) 0.04t 0 . 02* 0 . 02 0 .04* 0 . 02 0 . 02* 
(l. 80) (3 . 86) (0 . 57) (7.34) (0 . 71) (4.09) 
Faculty (Fl l. 95f 12.55t l.72t 15 . 03* 2 . 41* 13.64* 
(3. 84) (3 . 85) (3. 77) (5 . 38) (4.94) (4.22) 
Capital (K) 0.15 l . 83f -o. uf 0 . 36t 3 . oo* -0 . 21* 0 . 40. 3.01* -o. 19t 
( l. 02) (1 . 69) (2 . 42) (2 . 20) (2 . 66 ) (3 . 72) (2 . 43) (2 . 60) (4.06) 
Academic 6 . 51* -18 . 60 0 . 09 7 . 61* - 12 . 77 -0.02 6.05* -10 . 81 0 . 02 
(AC) (3 . 03) ( l. 06 l (0 . 13) (3 . 70) (0 . 73) (0 . 03) (2 . 82) (0 . 62) (0.03) 
Administration 0 . 47 1.10 0.40 
(ADJ (0 . 67) (1.57) (0.56) 
Research (RE) -0.14 0.07t -0.04 0 . 03 -0.16 0.07t 
( 1.14) (2.28) (0.33) (0 . 99) (1.26) (2.25) 
Tuition CT) 13 . 10* 3 . 94 14.58t 
(3 . 22) (0 . 85) (3 . 54) 
Scholarship -0.30* -0 . 19t - 0 . 33t 
(SCH) (2. 76) (2 . 05) (3 . 01) 
% on Scholar-
-0 . 11 -0 . 16 -0 . 11 
ship (%SCH) (0 . 50) (1.10) (0 . 53) 
Endowment (E) o . 06* 0 . 05t 0 . 01* 
(3.13) (2 . 02) (3 . 46) 
Faculty/Stud . 1 . 91* -4. 72 - 0.25 1.66* -3 . 10 -o . 11 1.60* -4 . 22 -0.18 
Ratio (FSR) (3.54) (1.05) (1. 56) (3 . 25) (0 . 71) (0 . 57) (2 . 97) (0 . 96) ( l. 11) 
Instrct. /Stud . 1 . 69 0 . 35 -0 . 65t 0 . 57 -1. 51 -0 . 15 1.53 -0 . 48 -0 . 53 
Ratio (ISR) (1 . 34) (0 . 04) ( 1. 80) (0 . 49) (0.16) (0 . 34) (1 . 22) (0 . 05) ( l. 46) 
Undergraduate 
-0 . 03 -0 . 25 0 . 00 -0 . 01 0 . 19 - 0 . 02 -0 . 04 -0.25 0.00 
Spec . (USR) (0.81) (0 . 93) (0 . 27) (0 . 13) (0 . 68) Cl. 22) ( 1.14) (0.95) (0.35) 
Campus #1 -0 . 04 -1.27 -0.22 
(NE Prep) (0 . 01) (0 . 29) (0.05) 
Campus #2 -0 . 09 -0 . 32 -0.35 
(Joe College) (0.03) (0 . 13) (0.11) 
Campus #3 3 . 72 1.66 3 . 60 
(Artsy) ( l. 24) (0 . 81) (1.20) 
Campus #4 -2 . 81 -2 . 80 -3.62 
(California) (0 . 94) ( 1.10) (1.17) 
(continued) 
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Table 8: Effects of Adjusting$ for Local Cost-of-Living Differences; 
Three-Stage Least-Squares Results With and Without Adjustment 
(Continued) 
Basic Model : COL Adjustments No COL Adjustments COL Adjustments to 
to F , K, AC, AD, RE F , AC, AD, RE 
Coefficients & (t-values) Coefficients & (t-values) Coefficients & Ct-values) 
Q s F Q s F Q s F 
Curricular #1 -0 . 58 8.0lt -0.46 5 . 18t -0 . 27 7.60t 
(Flexible) (0.81) (2.25) (0.64) ( 1. 82) (0 . 39) (2 . 17) 
Curricular #2 -0 . 48 7.26t -0 . 29 4 .22 -o. 33 7.22t 
(Depth) (0 . 77) (1. 97) (0 . 46) (1.45) (0.56) (2 . 01) 
Curricular #3 1. 02t -3 . 46 1 . oot -2 . 17 1. 03 t -2.89 
(Local) (2.08) (1.10) (2.09) (0 . 88) (2.19) (0.94) 
Curricular #4 -0.81 4.09 -0.84 2. 79 -0 . 73 3.46 
(Academic) ( 1. 66) (1. 30) (1. 75) (1.14) ( 1. 57) ( 1.13) 
% Male Stud's 0.16t -0 . 22 0.22* -0 . 12 0.17• -0.06 
(%MSTUD) (4.62) (0. 71) (5.70) (0.40) (4.85) (0 . 18) 
% Male Assoc. o.02t ~o . oo 0.01 
Fae . (%MFAC) Cl . 88 l (0.17) (1. 52) 
% Tenured Sen . 0 . 01 0.01 O. Olt 
Fae. (%TEN) (1. 58) (1.41) (1. 74) 
% Business -0 . 21* o.02t -o . 25t 0.02 -0.22• 0.02 
Maj 's (%BUS) (3.61) (1. 75) (4 . 17) (1. 56) (3.85) ( 1. 43) 
% Engineering -0 . 29# 0.06• -0 . 28* 0.04t -0.30t o . o5t 
Maj's (%ENG) (3.36) (2 . 76) (3.34) (1. 70) (3.36) (2.55) 
% Education -0 . 02 -0 . 03t 0 . 02 -0.03t -0 . 02 -o.03t 
Maj 's (%ED) (0.31) ( 1. 81) (0 . 30) (1. 79) (0.28) (1.80) 
Constant -90 . 11 t 578.50. 6 . 94 -65.29t 593.oo* -12.88t -80.60t 548.83# 6.15 
(6 . 71) (5 . 20) (1 . 50) (4 . 30) (6.60) (2 . 27) (5.83) (4.91) (1. 31) 
Mean 16 . 12 1122 . 91 26. 74 16 . 12 1122. 91 26 . 68 16.12 1122 . 91 26. 74 
Std Dev . 15.50 106.93 3 . 81 15 . 50 106.93 4 . 18 15.50 106 . 93 3.81 
Std Error 10 . 00 72.54 2 . 84 9 .41 74.20 3 . 48 10.47 73.30 2.86 
2S ResCor 1.00 1.00 1.00 
-0 . 34 1.00 -0 . 29 1.00 -0.21 1 . 00 
-0 . 32 -0 . 60 1.00 -0 . 19 -0.78 1.00 -0.42 -0.62 1.00 
3S ResCor 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.23 1.00 0 . 35 1.00 0.36 1.00 
-0 . 14 0. 17 1.00 0 . 61 0.36 1.00 0 . 08 0.35 1.00 
Denotes significance at the 0 . 05 level 
Denotes significance at the 0 . 01 level 
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for local COL disparities. The second set makes no COL adjustments , while 
the third set makes COL adjustments to all but the capital variable. 
Generally, the COL adjustment affects the estimates substantively. 
Even when restricting attention to instances where the level of statistical 
significance changes, numerous differences can be seen between the COL-
adjusted and nominal results. Furthermore, the influences extend beyond the 
pecuniary variables. Within the output equation, the quantitative and 
statistical importance of student quality (S) is enhanced by the COL adjust-
ment. In the student equation, output (Q), tuition (T), scholarships (SCH), 
and the second curricular index are all buttressed as well. Finally, in the 
faculty equation, output (Q), research expenditure (RE), endowment (E) , 
instructor-to-student ratio (ISR), percentage of associate professors who 
are male (%MFAC), and percentage of undergraduates majoring in business 
(%BUS) and engineering (%ENG) all gain though COL adjustment. 
There is clearly one discordant note, however, when comparing the first 
versus second set of results. Observe that Capital (K) is uniformly less 
influential across all three equations when enumerated in real terms. For 
this reason, we proceeded with a third estimation in which only capital was 
expressed in nominal terms. In that form, capital retains its strong level 
of significance across all three equations. In addition, other variables 
regain strength initially displayed with COL, but weakened when the model 
was estimated uniformly in nominal values. This is a vexing anomaly. 
Conceptually, capital would seem to be one of the more crucial of the 
pecuniary variables to be COL adjusted. After all, it is dominated by land 
and construction costs which vary substantially across geographic areas. 
Furthermore, Fournier and Rasmussen (1986) found median housing value to be 
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the dominant explanatory variable for COL differences across metropolitan 
statistical areas. On the other hand, our adjustment is based upon consumer 
COL rather than a preferred, but unavailable, producer price index which 
would evaluate commercial real estate. As such, perhaps our adjustment is 
reall y more appropriate for wage-dri v en expenditures such as faculty compen-
sation , academic and administrative costs . 2 9 If commercial real estate 
values vary less geographically than do housing values, a very large assump-
tion indeed, then the value of capital might be justifiably preserved in 
nominal terms. For this reason, we include the alternative results in the 
third column . Another explanation also exists. The volatility of the 
capital estimates might be attributed to its treatment as an exogenous 
variable. Plausibly, capital is an important choice variable in an univer-
sity objective function. As such, its influence might extend to other 
variables as well. 
5. Concluding Remarks and Lines of Future Research 
Any reading of the literature in the economics of educational produc-
tion conveys a clear skepticism for the prospects of meaningful empirical 
research. Against this backdrop, the conceptual and empirical lessons of 
this study stand out. 
29 Complicating all of this is the accounting morass from which the capital 
figures were obtained. Capital and land are listed at book value rather 
than market value. While no depreciation enters this accounting, renovations 
are treated as additions to the capital stock. For schools of widely differing 
ages and uneven growth rates , a vintage stock model is virtually intractable. 
Nevertheless, unless relative COL moved perversely to these capital trends, 
our COL adjustment should not distort the influence of capital. 
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The strength of simultaneity among quality students, faculty, and 
institutional output is clearly demonstrated. Further, the results confirm 
the potential bias of cross-equation error-correlations and thus establish 
the appropriateness of a three-stage estimation procedure. This study has 
also introduced an intriguing method of measuring educational production, 
and has given special emphasis to quality-adjustment within important quan-
titative variables. Finally, the composite policy recommendation which 
emerges is, while perhaps unsurprising, worth repeating -- emphasize human 
capital in the production of human capital. Quality students and quality 
faculty, buttressed by academic support, are the major cogs driving educa-
tional production. 
Lest the policy implications of these results seem too one-dimensional, 
we prefer to stress these findings as a reminder of priorities for educa-
tional policy. One could not argue that other factors are not facilitating, 
only that they contribute less directly to educational production. 
On closer inspection, a subtle yet pervasive concept is also discern-
able throughout the results . This concept addresses the current literature 
and is also suggestive of further research within the general framework 
developed here. The empirical relationship revealed in the faculty equation 
provides an instructive focus in this regard. Recall that we have found 
universities substitute capital as well as instructional personnel for 
faculty quality. In other words, administrators of private institutions 
not only recognize tradeoffs among factor inputs, they react to them. 
While such a result does not necessarily imply the cost-minimizing strategy 
of profit-maximizing enterprises, it is certainly inconsistent with Bowen's 
(1980) viP-w that colleges cost-maximize subject to their ability to raise 
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revenue . Furthermore, this result suggest very strongly that administrative 
behavior be treated endogenously, just as we have done for students and 
faculty. In short, faculty and students are important players, but they do 
not exhaust the cast. 
Incorporating a university objective function into our model might 
clarif y anomalies noted previously. For example , recall the strong positive 
relationship between student quality and tuition. This result is a classic 
symptom of under-identification in a supply-and-demand relationship. Tui-
tion is a choice variable not only of students, but also of private univer-
sities in an imperfect market. Similarly, we question whether the level of 
the capital stock is not also an important argument within an institution's 
objective function . For instance, the administrative objective might be to 
maximize legacies of land, endowment, and capital subject to certain size 
and/or quality constraints. Furthermore, Garvin (1980) has already provided 
a useful point of departure for this type of extension, albeit with a pre-
dominantly university rather than collegiate orientation. 
Despite the obvious conceptual appeal, an administrative equation 
introduces a host of variables that could arguably be treated endogenously. 
The faculty-student ratio is a prime example, as is the size of the student 
body . The problem with this type of broad rethinking of the system is that 
it ultimately ends with a general-equilibrium treatment of the university 
environment . While conceptually superior, such a treatment presents a host 
of theoretical and econometric challenges well beyond the scope of this 
project . But we believe the conceptual perspective of the current study is 
the appropriate one, and that the empirical methods applied here extend 
modestly , yet measurably, in a promising direction. 
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